论伊拉克对外群体的看法--留学essay范文精选
英国留学essay范文精选：“论伊拉克对外群体的看法”本文主要内容讲述了在2003年的伊拉克的解放,很多人问,真的有希望让公民社会摆脱混乱，我们猜测逊尼派、什叶派和库尔德派系可以聚集在一起,民族冲突将导致内战。寻找一个更好的理解,这篇report代写范文试图解决的是，伊拉克种族和宗教身份与其他群体的关系，所发现的问题是宗教、民族起源和地理位置。这个调查的后续项目在社交网络上,确立发展的理论探索和解释研究人员和在伊拉克公民社会的因素。
Abstract
At the Iraq "liberation" in 2003, many of us asked, "Is there really hope for civil society to emerge from the chaos?" We guessed about how Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish factions could be brought together, and if it was likely that ethnic conflicts would lead to civil war. Seeking a better understanding of the situation, this project tried to address: "How do Iraqis' ethnic and religious identities relate to perceptions of other groups (outgroups)?" and "how does place of residence relate to those perceptions about outgroups?" I collected 479 surveys of Iraqi opinions in Iraq, Jordan, and The Netherlands. I asked Iraqis for their own ideas about their future, personal and collective, and their perceptions of Those Other Groups, their "outgroups." What did I find? That background items of religion, ethnic origin, and location, alone, did not relate strongly to respondents’ attitudes towards outgroups. But, some combinations of background items did give significant differences in perceptions towards other groups. For example, "moderate” Arabs in Iraq were the group most opposed to foreigners, and were the group most opposed to expatriate Iraqis returning to Iraq. This project, and the follow-up project on social networks of Iraqis, presents one approach from which researchers and fieldworkers can develop theories to explore and explain elements of civil society in Iraq, and beyond.
Introduction
The 2003 change of government in Iraq set up opportunity for a different Iraq to emerge: a unified nation-state, with some degree of civil society and tolerance by each of the main ethnic groups for each others' rights to: -equality before and rule by law -secure access to food, shelter, and clothing -equal voice to shape their future. Unfortunately, there was no body of literature available on: -tribal or intergroup confederations, allegiances, or compositions -ingroup, outgroup, or intergroup definitions or perceptions of each other -differences between intergroup perceptions in different locations I also could not find research instruments designed to measure intergroup perceptions of Iraqi peoples. All together, this seemed a unique opportunity to explore intergroup relations in a regimechange context.
Purpose
I wanted to accomplish five things in this pilot project: 1. Collect data on Iraq ethnic and religious perceptions about threat from other groups-- immediately after the war, 2. Evaluate this research process, 3. Analyze the data, looking for interesting facts about the people surveyed and their perceptions of those of other groups, 4. Put findings quickly into the hands of Iraq fieldworkers, 5. Design follow-up studies on Iraqi social networks and how they affect repatriation into home societies of Iraqis living abroad.
Questions
I explored included: 1. How do ethnic and religious identities relate to perceptions of threat from other groups? i.e.: Would all Sunni respondents express similar perceptions towards Shia Iraqis? 2. How do locations of respondents relate to perceptions of threat from other groups? i.e.: Would respondents in urban Basra express different ideas than those in rural Basra? 3. How do perceptions about return migration differ among groups and locations? i.e.: Would all Iraqis express similar perceptions towards the return of expatriate Iraqis? 4. How do perceptions differ concerning threat by foreign states? i.e.: Would all respondents perceive in the same way the intentions of the USA and Iran?
Background: This post-conflict environment and ideals of "Civil Society"
Before I present my research process, it is important to describe my understanding of Iraq's social situation, because it seems to me that hope for good living in Iraq would come from three integrated types of civility:
1. Personal norms, morals, and values promoted as "good" in a community,
2. Associations of organized groups and informal networks that are active in geographic, financial, political, and religious interests of their members, and
3. Overarching authority to provide equality before the law, provide food-shelter-clothing resources, and provide a voice in shaping their common future.2 These are reasonable ambitions for nation-builders in Iraq. According to Michael Edwards, the World Bank working definition for civil society is "the arena in which people come 3 together to pursue the interests they hold in common; it includes all organisations and associations between family and state, except firms". 3 Kaviraj contributes a historical perspective, saying that "Civil society is not a new, post-Hegelian concept. It is a much older term, which entered into English usage via the Latin translation, 'societas civilis', of Aristotle's 'koinonia politike'.
In its original sense, it allowed no distinction between 'state' and 'society' or between political and civil society: it simply meant a community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order, and was variously rendered as 'society' or 'community'”.4 This applies here, because nation building in Iraq needs a government established through just political and legal processes, and needs threat-free associations for the common good. This is the only basis from which to deal morally with criminal actions, while increasing security for non-criminals. Without a strong central government to facilitate equal protection under the law and equal access to resources, and without evidence of many non-state organizations with membership across ethnic and religious lines, security seems mostly based in social networks--among near-kinsmen and close friends. Without security beyond such a small circle of relationships, Civil Society and civil society, is unlikely to happen. This is why perceptions of threat from outgroups must be understood.
How can we compare outgroup perceptions? Nelson claims that traditional prejudice and bias research relies upon measures that can confuse a specific emotional response with a general group stereotype.5 For example, bias is usually measured as the difference between how we see our own group and how we see That Other Group. My opinion is that exploring bias and prejudice between and among groups in Iraq needs to access both open and hidden personal viewpoints on outgroups. For example, a common media expression now is that Iraqis hate Americans. That is not true. There is no national hatred of Americans. Yes, there are some groups, and many individuals who hate America, or Americans. But not all groups and certainly not all individuals.
Historical Context of Iraq: The main thread of importance--Power against Outgroups
The history of Iraq built many constraints on the development of a representative and civil society expression in Iraq. I list the major points tersely to emphasize their significance, not to minimize them. --The area known as Iraq was the birthplace of agriculture, domestic animals, the wheel, and writing. It was also home to the mega-power centers of the Akkadian, Assyrian, Chaldean, and Babylonian empires which all supported regime-sponsored violence against minority populations.
--The (foreign) Arab conquest of Iraq in the 7th century AD magnified power struggles between Mesopotamian and Arab cultures. Ali ibn abi Talib, son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammed, who was murdered in Iraq, "appears to have been of a mild and kindly disposition, insufficiently ruthless to dominate so turbulent a community". 10 Did loyal followers of Ali kill him because he was insufficiently ruthless to rule Iraq?
--The (foreign) Mongol massacres in the 13th - 14th centuries left the land and peoples destitute of their famous irrigation systems, their literature, and their organized social systems. These foreign-led massacres are remembered. --The (foreign) Turkish occupation from the 16th century, reconstructed government systems for taxation and rule by decree and power, not law. Social groups seen as indominatable were destroyed.
--The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916, drew the multi-ethnic geographic boundaries within the Turkish/Ottoman Empire, with rule over Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia given to a (foreign) Saudi Arabian tribe as reward for their political loyalty. 11 The new king did not represent the best interests of the Iraqi people and his reign was brief.
--In 1958, pan-Arabism & anti-foreignism brought Saddam and his near kinsmen into being THE ingroup; everyone else was of the absolute outgroup. Under their rule, no sphere of life was without state control. There were NO civil or private affairs, and approximately four million Iraqis left the country to seek a more civil life elsewhere. --The 2003 (foreign) overthrow of the ruling regime was not by popular election, and rule by law is not yet the norm. Security is still missing, as is civility.
Conclusions
Content. The findings from my study of perceptions of outgroups in Iraq include the following outcomes with respect to my purposes of the project.
1. Ethnic and religious identities, alone, did not relate directly to perceptions of outgroups. There were no strong perceptions that could be directly attributed to only ethnicity or to religion. In future surveys, there needs a stronger differentiation for other ethnic and religious identities, such as Armenian, Chaldean, Assyrian, Turkoman and Mandaean, as well as those with foreign ancestry.
2. Different survey locations did reveal differing perceptions towards the repatriation of foreign-living Iraqis, and towards other outgroup perceptions. That is, people in different places expressed different perceptions about groups different from themselves.
3. There were differences in perceptions of threat or domination by foreign states. That is, not all Iraqis expressed the same perceptions about anything or any state!
4. There was considerable difference in opinion about the return of a Saddam-like government. This work began in May 2003, when his location was still unknown to most people.
